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ABSTRACT Until enactment of the Law of 14 April 2011, suspects questioned by 
the police in France were entitled to meet their lawyer only once in the first 24 hours 
of custodial interrogation and only for thirty minutes, and were not notified of their 
right to silence. Extrapolating from French criminal procedure’s pre-April 14th 
exceptionalism in this area, this article challenges the position of modern legal 
systems’ fast growing cosmopolitanism and argues that when one moves from rough 
generalisations to specific contextual inquiries, a more nuanced picture of legal 
systems’ cosmopolitan tendencies may emerge. But this article also demonstrates that 
legal cosmopolitanism can be a powerful force for legal reform. The April 14
th
 
legislation was introduced quickly as a result of European Court of Human Rights  
jurisprudence against the backdrop of two centuries’ incremental development of 
French criminal procedure in this domain. This contrast lends itself to translating the 
April 14
th
 reforms as a result of cosmopolitan pressures coming from outside the 
national legal system rather than cosmopolitan attitudes spontaneously generated from 
within. The article illustrates that external cosmopolitan pressures go hand in hand 
with local resistance, that legal nationalism underpins local resistance and that 
resistance fluctuates depending on the institution at the receiving end of cosmopolitan 
pressures. It concludes that indigenous cosmopolitan attitudes, generated through a 
renewed emphasis on comparative law, can better accommodate resistance. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Salduz v Turkey
1
 
has led to considerable reforms of custodial interrogation regimes in many European 
countries.
2
 In France, it paved the way for the introduction of legislation – the Law of 
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to n 61-64). In the UK, a number of high-profile Supreme Court cases applying Salduz have had a 
major impact on the regime of custodial interrogation in Scotland. See Cadder v. HM Advocate [2010] 
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14 April 2011
3
 relating to the garde à vue
4
 – which recognized for the first time the 
right of suspects to have their lawyer present when questioned by the police.
5
 Until 
then, suspects were entitled to meet with a lawyer only once during the first 24 hours 
of the garde à vue and only for thirty minutes.
6
 This legislation also reintroduced the 
duty for the police to notify suspects of their right to remain silent,
7
 which had had a 
short and troubled history until then.
8
 These developments set in motion a transition 
from a model of custodial interrogation rooted in the inquisitorial tradition to a model 
more consistent with adversarial principles. 
I understand an inquisitorial model of custodial interrogation as one that is 
mainly characterized by limited access to legal advice, lawyers’ passive role and 
reduced opportunity to contradict the officials in charge of the process, and even an 
expectation for the defence to assist in the discovery of truth.
9
 I see this as opposed to 
an adversarial orientated model, which places emphasis on legal assistance and the 
ability to contest the officials, while being averse to compelling the suspect to convert 
into an informational source.
10
 The right to legal assistance and the notification of the 
right to silence mirror these adversarial goals.
11
 The injection of these two rights into 
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9
 See generally M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the 
Legal Process (Yale: Yale University Press, 1986) 164. See also J. Bell, French Legal Cultures 
(London: Butterworths, 2001) 150; S. Field and A. West, ‘Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: 
French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal Process’ [2003] Criminal Law Forum 261, 285; C. 
Slobogin, ‘An Empirically Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory Approaches to 
Police Investigation’ in P.J. Van Koppen and S.D. Penrod, Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Justice – 
Psychological Perspectives on Criminal Justice Systems (New York: Kluwer Academic/ Plenum 
Publishers, 2003) 27, 45; P. Duff, ‘Changing Conceptions of the Scottish Criminal Trial: The Duty to 
Agree Uncontroversial Evidence’ in A. Duff and others (eds), The Trial on Trial – Volume One: Truth 
and Due Process (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 29, 30; J. Cédras, La justice pénale aux Etats-Unis 
(2
nd
 edn, Paris: Economica, 2005) 5; J. Hodgson, French Criminal Justice: A Comparative Account of 
the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 26. 
10
 See Moran v. Burbine 475 US 412, 434-435 (1986) [Stevens J, dissenting, quoting Watts v. Indiana 
338 US 49, 54 (1949)]. Damaška, ibid. 126; E. Grande, ‘Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on 
Systemic Differences and the Search for Truth’ in J. Jackson, M. Langer and P. Tillers (eds), Crime, 
Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context: Essays in Honour of Professor 
Mirjan Damaška (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 145; D. A. Sklansky, ‘Anti-Inquisitorialism’, 122 
Harvard Law Review 1635, 1665 (2009); J. Hodgson, ‘The Future of Adversarial Criminal Justice in 
21
st
 Century Britain’, 32 North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 319, 
331 (2010). 
11
 The recognition of the right to silence in modern criminal procedure is inextricably linked to the 
historic transition from the inquisitorial to the adversarial model, and the emergence of the suspect as a 
subject of the criminal process. T. Dalakouras, ‘The Suspect’s Silence in the Criminal Process’ (1989) 
43 Armenopoulos 317 (in Greek). See also J. McEwan, Evidence and the Adversarial Process (2
nd
 edn, 
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an inquisitorial phase of the criminal process in France provides the background 
against which the two notions central to this article – legal cosmopolitanism and local 
resistance – will be investigated.  
The concept of legal cosmopolitanism is flexible and elusive.
12
 For the 
purposes of the inquiries that follow, it will be perceived as a modern phenomenon 
that is ‘exemplified by the conjunction of an increasingly robust international human 
rights law … with the rapid evolution of transnational criminal justice policy 
making’,13 the unprecedented proliferation of international criminal courts and the 
emergence of a dialogue between supreme court judges and other leading members of 
the legal community in different legal systems.
14
 Now attesting to such a 
cosmopolitan character of modern legal systems is rapidly becoming cliché. National 
law is seen as interacting with foreign law more frequently than ever before
15
 and as 
being shaped under international and transnational law influences that are so dynamic 
as to call into question the ‘capacities, competencies and legitimation claims of the 
nation state itself’,16 to the extent that ‘justice can no longer be seen as a purely local 
phenomenon’.17 Traditions and legal orders are observed as opening to each other, 
living in each other’s midst, in ways that allegedly strongly resonate with the 
cosmopolitan vision of Kant and Derrida.
18
 ‘Law is thus [conceived as being] open to 
the world’,19  making redundant ‘a static conception of laws in favor of a vision 
decidedly evolutionary’. 20  We are even beginning to look for signs of emerging 
unified legal cultures, for example ‘a European legal culture, distinct from pre-
existing national traditions’, 21  and we have already envisioned the creation of a 
‘global legal culture’.22 The question then arises on how, in a time of cosmopolitan 
law, phenomena unveiling the isolationism and exceptionalism of a particular legal 
system ought to be interpreted. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 168. This is a fortiori the case with respect to recognition of the right to 
legal assistance. See generally G.A. Magkakis, The Lawyer: A Paradoxical Conquest of Civilization - 
Study Not Just for Jurists (Athens: A.N. Sakkoulas, 2004) 33 (in Greek). 
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 P. Roberts, ‘Rethinking the Law of Evidence: a Twenty-First Century Agenda for Teaching and 
Research’ in P. Roberts and M. Redmayne (eds), Innovations in Evidence and Proof: Integrating 
Theory, Research and Proof  (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 19, 50. 
13
 P. Roberts, ‘Faces of Justice Adrift? Damaška’s Comparative Method and the Future of Common 
Law Evidence’ in Jackson, Langer and Tillers (eds) (n 10 above) 295, 325. 
14
 J. Bell, Book Review (2003) 52 ICLQ 270. 
15
 C. Rozakis, ‘The European Judge as a Comparatist’, 80 Tulane Law Review 257, 258 (2005-2006). 
16
 A. Crawford (ed), International and Comparative Criminal Justice and Urban Governance: 
Convergence and Divergence in Global, National and Local Settings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) 1. See also J. McLean, ‘From Empire to Globalization: The New Zealand 
Experience’, 11 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 161 (2004); J. Habermas, The Divided West 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006) 176; D. Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity, 
2010) Chapter 3. 
17
 R. Vogler, A World View of Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 2.  
18
 R. Janda, ‘Toward Cosmopolitan Law’, 50 McGill LJ 967, 981 (2005). 
19
 G. Canivet, ‘The Practice of Comparative Law by the Supreme Courts: Brief Reflections on the 
Dialogue Between the Judges in French and European Experience’ in B. Markesinis and J. Fedtke 
(eds), Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration (London: UCL Press, 2006) 
308, 312. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 H. Muir Watt, ‘Evidence of an Emergent European Legal Culture: Public Policy Requirements of 
Procedural Fairness Under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions’, 36 Texas International Law Journal 
539, 541 (2001). 
22
 R. Menyhart, ‘Changing Identities and Changing Law: Possibilities for a Global Legal Culture’, 10 
Indian Journal of Global Legal Studies 157 (2003). 
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The starting point for this line of inquiry will be the observation that until the 
April 2011 reform suspects in France were deprived of two of the most commonly 
cited procedural rights applying to custodial interrogation – legal assistance and 
notification of the right to silence –, in stark contrast to foreign and international law. 
This insular approach sits uneasily with a view of the French legal system as 
cosmopolitan. A cosmopolitan legal system is arguably characterized by ‘breadth of 
vision’ and ‘freedom from parochial limitations and attachments’,23 as evidenced, in 
particular, by its willingness and capacity to interact with foreign and international 
law, ‘to open a dialogue with laws and legal practices developed outside [its] 
jurisdictional confines in [an] effort to draw inspiration from them’.24 Conversely, a 
legal system where national solutions are disconnected from those presented by 
foreign and international law, and which ‘closes itself off in a particularistic fashion’, 
to borrow a phrase from Habermas,
25
 cannot make a valid claim to having a 
cosmopolitan vision. From this angle, the observation about pre-April 14
th
 
isolationism lends itself to the interpretation that when one moves from rough 
generalizations to specific contextual inquiries, a more nuanced picture of modern 
legal systems’ cosmopolitan tendencies may emerge, hence the need for contextual 
inquiries that can shed light on the complex relationship between the cosmopolitan 
attitudes inherent in international and comparative law’s growing influence and the 
provincial attitudes that the same external influences may generate. 
At the same time, with the Law of April 14
th
, the transition from an out-of-
sync position to a sudden realignment with the international community is of 
particular value when extrapolating French criminal procedure’s cosmopolitan 
character, or lack thereof, from its approach to the two rights examined here. This is 
particularly so given the unquestionable impact of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) on this transitional process, which can be deciphered as a 
clear sign of cosmopolitan tendencies manifesting themselves. It is equally intriguing 
to observe how the impact of external cosmopolitan influences fluctuates depending 
on the institution that is at the receiving end. The judiciary has been quick to translate 
these external influences into a true driving force for reform. The executive and the 
legislature have received the same influences with much less enthusiasm, which 
resulted in often undercurrent yet strongly felt forces of local resistance distorting the 
adversarial vision of the reform. 
This sharp contrast between legal cosmopolitanism and local resistance, as 
opposite forces shaping law reform, will form the backbone of my argument. Put 
another way, my inquiries will be situated within the context of two conflicting 
trends, insightfully described by the former First President of the Cour de cassation 
(Supreme Court of France), Guy Canivet: ‘the incommensurability - irreducibility of 
legal cultures, on the one hand, and convergence, on the other, [which] set in motion 
contradictory movements between singularity and rapprochement in the legal 
systems’.26 Section II will highlight France’s exceptionalism in regulating custodial 
interrogation. Section III will present an opportunity to contrast this insular approach 
with the almost reflexive response to ECtHR jurisprudence. Finally, Section IV will 
identify important signs of local resistance to cosmopolitan pressures to move in a 
                                                        
23
 W. Twining, ‘Cosmopolitan Legal Studies’ (2002) 9 International Journal of the Legal Profession 
99, 103. 
24
 Rozakis (n 15 above) 257. 
25
 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1996) 514. 
26
 Above (n 19) 310. 
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more adversarial direction. In this way, it will be argued that, despite appearances to 
the contrary, we might still be a long way from witnessing the emergence of 
cosmopolitan legal systems that spontaneously engage in constructive dialogue with 
foreign legal cultures and international law. 
  
II  FRENCH EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
Lawyers can historically be regarded as personae non gratae at police stations in 
France, and the right to silence is an illusion. The historical review that follows will 
provide evidence for this.
27
 Examples from foreign and international law will support 
a diagnosis of considerable pre-April 14
th
 exceptionalism in this area. 
 
2.1 Custodial Legal Assistance and Notification of the Right to Silence Prior to the 
Law of 14 April 2011 
 
Suspects in France first obtained the right to consult a lawyer during the garde à vue 
with the Law of 4 January 1993.
28
 Introduced by a Socialist government, this 
legislation gave suspects the right to request a meeting with a lawyer, lasting a 
maximum of thirty minutes, from the beginning of the garde à vue.
29
 This consisted 
in a small revolution, according to no less an authority than the Minister of Justice at 
the time.
30
 However, despite breaking with the past, it is hard to see how the 
embryonic right, which had inherited the inquisitorial legacy of non-interference with 
the power of the police to conduct interrogations, could be conceived as anything 
more than a reserved move towards recognizing a limited role for lawyers in custodial 
interrogation. In any case, the Commission Justice pénale et droits de l’homme had 
proposed a much more progressive solution. Chaired by the eminent comparatist 
Mireille Delmas-Marty, the Commission looked into custodial interrogation 
legislation in a number of common law and civil law countries,
31
 and examined 
relevant norms of international law,
32
 before proposing that the suspect should have 
                                                        
27
 This brief overview of reforms relating to custodial legal assistance and notification of the right to 
silence can be read with Jacqueline Hodgson’s more analytical accounts of the reforms of the garde à 
vue that have taken place since the beginning of the 90s and, especially, between 1993 and 2004. See, 
in particular, ‘Constructing the Pre-trial Role of the Defence in French Criminal Procedure: an 
Adversarial Outsider in an Inquisitorial Process’ (2002) 6 E & P 1; ‘Codified Criminal Procedure and 
Human Rights: Some Observations on the French Experience’ [2003] Crim LR 165, 173; French 
Criminal Justice (n 9 above) 39. See also Field and West, ‘Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition’ (n 
9 above) 284; R. Vogler, ‘Reform Trends in Criminal Justice: Spain, France and England & Wales’, 4 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 631, 634 (2005).  
28
 The Napoleonic Code d’instruction criminelle 1808 was providing for the right to be assisted by a 
lawyer solely at trial, while the Law of 8 December 1897 had extended the right to the pre-trial phase, 
but only in relation to interrogations undertaken by the investigating judge. In fact, custodial 
interrogation remained a ‘legal black hole’ until the Code of Penal Procedure 1959 regulated the 
practice, but there was again no provision for legal assistance. See J. Pradel, ‘Vers une métamorphose 
de la garde à vue. Après la “décision pilote” du Conseil constitutionnel du 30 juillet 2010 et les arrêts 
de la chambre criminelle du 19 septembre 2010’, Recueil Dalloz 2010, 2783; J. Pradel, ‘Centenaire de 
la loi du 8 décembre 1897 sur la défense avant jugement pénal: essai d’un bilan’, Recueil Dalloz 1997, 
375. 
29
 Art 63-4 CPP. 
30
 Débats Assemblée nationale, 30 November 1992, 6272. 
31
 La mise en état des affaires pénales (Paris: La documentation française, 1991) 38. The Commission 
took its comparative law examples from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, 
Portugal and West Germany. 
32
 Ibid., at 83. 
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the right to be continuously assisted by a lawyer during questioning, and that the 
lawyer should be able to ask questions and permanently access the investigation 
dossier.
33
  
However, consultation at the beginning of the garde à vue was already seen as 
going too far in an adversarial direction. Thus, when a government of the Right came 
into power, only three months after this legislation was enacted, it voted the Law of 
24 August 1993
34
, which moved the first meeting with a lawyer to 20 hours into the 
garde à vue
35
 and created exceptional regimes of garde à vue, barring suspects’ 
access to a lawyer for 36 hours in cases of organized crime and 72 hours in cases 
relating more specifically to terrorism and drug-related offences.
36
 
The political ping-pong did not end there. A Socialist government introduced 
the loi sur la présomption d’innocence (‘Law of the presumption of innocence’) in 
June 2000.
37
 This reform was orientated towards protecting suspects’ rights; 
recognizing the right to meet with a lawyer from the outset of the garde à vue was an 
important pillar in the effort to achieve this.
38
 More precisely, the new regime 
provided for thirty-minute meetings at the beginning of the garde à vue and then 20 
hours into the process, as well as 36 hours after the beginning of the garde à vue, in 
cases where the latter would be extended beyond the 24-hour time limit. Outside these 
short periods of time, however, lawyers would not be allowed to meet their client. 
They would have no access to the investigation dossier either, even though they 
would be informed of the presumed date and nature of the suspected offence. From 
this point of view, it is hard to imagine how one would disagree with the view that the 
lawyer’s intervention in the garde à vue was of limited legal significance under this 
legislation, consisting in nothing more than an opportunity to offer psychological 
support, ‘reassure the interested party by explaining to him what, eventually, awaits 
him’.39 The 2000 legislation also maintained the exceptional regimes of garde à vue, 
which is further proof of the quite mitigated effect it has had upon the inquisitorial 
character of the latter. Nevertheless, this legislation was met with great scepticism, 
mainly on the part of the police, but in some academic circles as well.
40
 
                                                        
33
 Ibid., at 113. In Continental legal systems, documents relating to police investigation and 
interrogation are typically concentrated on an ‘investigation dossier’ that is freely accessible by the 
parties throughout the pre-trial stage of the criminal process. 
34
 Loi n° 93-1013 du 24 août 1993 modifiant la loi n° 93-2 du 4 janvier 1993 portant réforme de la 
procédure pénale. 
35
 Art 63-4 CPP modified by the Law of 24 August 1993. 
36
 Art 63-4 CPP. The circular of the August legislation characteristically explained that ‘the efficiency 
of the repressive apparatus’ had to be guaranteed. See JORF n°196 du 25 août 1993, Circulaire du 
24 août 1993 relative à la loi n° 93-1013 modifiant la loi n° 93-2 du 4 janvier 1993 portant réforme de 
la procédure pénale. 
37
 Loi n° 2000-516 du 15 juin 2000 renforçant la protection de la présomption d’innocence et les droits 
des victimes. 
38
 F. Taquet, ‘Brèves approches sur les nouvelles dispositions relatives à la garde à vue’, La Gazzette 
du Palais, 8-9 septembre 2000, 9, 10. 
39
 T. Garré, ‘Les droits de la défense en procédure pénale’ in R. Cabrillac, M. A. Frison-Roche and T. 
Revet, Libertés et droits fondamentaux (11
th
 edn, Paris: Dalloz, 2005) 513, 520. 
40
 Pradel’s comments are symptomatic of such scepticism. His concern was that application of the right 
would impact on the efficiency of the criminal process and that lawyers would lobby for the right to 
assist permanently their clients during questioning. See J. Pradel, ‘Encore une tornade sur notre 
procédure pénale avec la loi du 15 juin 2000’, Recueil Dalloz 2000, point de vue, 5, 6 ; J. Pradel, ‘Les 
personnes suspectes ou poursuivies après la loi du 15 juin 2000: évolution ou révolution?’, Recueil 
Dalloz 2001, chr, 1042. 
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Despite all this, the 2000 legislation represented, until the April 2011 reforms 
at least, the ‘high point in the legislation of due process protections’.41 Supposing that 
this was indeed the liberal era of criminal procedure reforms, 9/11 and its aftermath 
marked its end. With respect to custodial legal assistance, legislation introduced in 
2004 now allowed for a second meeting between the suspect and his lawyer only at 
the beginning of the extension of a garde à vue beyond the 24-hour time limit.
42
 This 
meant that there would be no opportunity for a second meeting in cases where the 
interrogation would be terminated before the expiry of that limit. Furthermore, in 
relation to organized crime offences, the time of the first meeting was moved to 48 
hours into the garde à vue, with a second meeting 72 hours into it, while in relation to 
terrorist and drug-related offences, the suspect would have no access to counsel 
before a whole 72 hours had passed.
43
 The 2004 legislation constituted an important 
axis in France’s fight against terrorism after 9/11. The changes it brought to access to 
legal advice must therefore be seen through the prism of the securitarian obsession 
that characterized France in that period.
44
 
We have seen that since the beginning of the 1990s much ink has been spilt 
over the exact moment in which the lawyer should intervene in the garde à vue, and 
yet, until the Law of 14 April 2011, progress in this area had been marginal. ‘One step 
forward, two steps back’ epitomizes the effect of successive legal reforms. The same 
can be said of developments concerning notification of the right to silence. First of all, 
it was only in 2000 that a caution was enacted into positive law; for the first time 
police officers had to inform a suspect, immediately upon detention, that he had ‘the 
right not to respond to the questions that [would] be posed to him by the 
investigators’.45 In the eyes of an academic commentator, this was ‘a highly symbolic 
move’. 46  The right had previously only been based on the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR,
47
 but it was now being incorporated into the Code of Penal Procedure.
48
 At 
the same time, there were strong reservations about this reform. They were first 
mirrored in a Ministry of Justice circular,
49
 which explained that the right should not 
be ‘understood as enabling the suspect to put an end to his interrogation’ and that ‘a 
first refusal to speak [would] evidently not prohibit investigators from continuing to 
ask all the questions that might appear necessary to them’.50 Reservations turned into 
uneasiness first, dislike later, as the pendulum swung from the liberty- and rights-
centred debates that were central to the 2000 legislation to a post-9/11 environment 
                                                        
41
 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice (n 9 above) 45. 
42
 Art 63-4 s. 6 CPP, modified by the Law of 9 March 2004 (Loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant 
adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité). 
43
 Art 63-4 s. 7 CPP, modified by the Law of 9 March 2004.  
44
 See L. Mucchielli (éd), La frénesie sécuritaire: retour à l’ordre et nouveau contrôle social (Paris: 
Éd. La Découverte, 2008); M. Delmas-Marty, Libertés et sûreté dans un monde dangereux (Paris: 
Seuil, 2010). 
45
 Art 63-1 s. 1 CPP, modified by the Law of 15 June 2000. 
46
 J. D. Nuttens, ‘Présomption d’innocence: le Parlement fait la loi’, La Gazzette du Palais, 21-22 juin 
2000, 2, 5. 
47
 J. Buisson, ‘La garde à vue dans la loi du 15 juin 2000’, Revue de science criminelle 2001, 25, 36.  
48
 H. Leclerc, ‘La loi du 15 juin 2000 (Gaz. Pal, Bull. lég. 13 juillet, p. 263 et circ. p. 287) renforçant la 
présomption d’innocence et les droits des victimes’, Gaz Pal, 29-30 septembre 2000, 2, 3. 
49
 Ministry of Justice circulars follow the enactment of legislation, offering interpretation of the 
legislative text enacted and specific guidance relating to its application. 
50
 Circulaire CRIM 00-13 F1 du 4 décembre 2000, présentant les dispositions de la loi du 15 juin 2000 
renforçant la protection de la présomption d’innocence et les droits des victimes concernant la garde à 
vue et l’enquête de police judiciaire, para 2.1. 
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where preoccupations with security and law and order dominated the political 
agenda.
51
 
This led to the amendment of the wording of the caution in March 2002. 
Remaining silent would now be presented as only one of different options available to 
the suspect, who would be informed that he could ‘make a statement, answer the 
questions posed to him or remain silent’.52 Not many will disagree that a caution of 
this type demonstrates little enthusiasm for the exercise of the right. Just in case there 
are any doubts, the relevant Law circular should cause them to evaporate. It clarified 
that ‘the right not to respond to questions posed by the investigators [should] not be 
perceived by persons subjected to the garde à vue as an incitement to remain silent’.53 
These changes were implemented by a Socialist government that had introduced the 
notification duty in much stronger terms only two years earlier. A new government of 
the Right with a strong focus on security and public order
54
 then gave the right to 
silence the final blow, with legislation passed in March 2003, mainly as a result of 
pressures exercised by magistrates and the police.
55
 This legislation removed the duty 
to notify suspects of their right to remain silent altogether. In less than three years, 
France had thus gone from finally obliging the police to notify suspects of their right 
to silence to compromising considerably its application in practice, and then to 
abolition. 
In conclusion, until the Law of 14 April 2011, France had strongly resisted 
two reforms capable of enhancing the adversarial character of the garde à vue. Access 
to custodial legal advice and presence of counsel during questioning, on the one side, 
notification of the right to silence, on the other, can strengthen the informed and 
voluntary participation of suspects in custodial interrogation but at the same time have 
the potential to obstruct truth discovery. Perhaps then, from the local viewpoint of a 
legal system that has evolved through the years with the objective of truth discovery 
primarily in mind,
56
 there was nothing peculiar about the resistance to these two 
adversarial reforms. As will be demonstrated below, however, such unbending 
insistence upon inquisitorialism was myopic, failing to take into account that the 
above two rights were fast growing in significance – not only in their traditional 
adversarial strongholds but also in inquisitorial fields where conditions for their 
fertilization were far from ideal – and that international law has progressively become 
suspicious of suspects’ isolation and disempowerment at this crucial stage of the 
criminal process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
51
 See Hodgson, French Criminal Justice (n 9 above) 39. 
52
 Art 63-1 CPP s. 1 CPP modified by the Law of 4 March 2002 (Loi n° 2002-307 du 4 mars 2002 
complétant la loi n° 2000-516 du 15 juin 2000 renforçant la protection de la présomption d’innocence 
et les droits des victimes). 
53
 CRIM-02-07-E8 du 19 mars 2002 présentant les dispositions de la loi du 4 mars 2002 qui complètent 
la loi nº 2000-516 du 15 juin 2000, laquelle renforce la protection de la présomption d’innocence et les 
droits des victimes.  
54
 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice (n 9 above) 48.  
55
 C. Lazerges, ‘La dérive de la procédure pénale’, Revue de science criminelle 2003, 644, 647. 
56
 See generally J. Spencer, ‘La procédure pénale française vue par un Anglo-Saxon’ in Cour de 
cassation, La procédure pénale en quête de cohérence (Paris: Dalloz, 2007) 227, 233.  
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2.2 Foreign and International Law Perspectives  
 
Prior to the 2011 reforms, French legislation on custodial interrogation was ‘a long 
way from satisfying European mandates’, according to Matsopoulou, 57  while 
Lazerges spoke of an isolation of French texts and practice, and of ‘a French 
exception’, notably on the issue of lawyers’ presence at the garde à vue.58 Coming 
from the mouth of ‘French’ academics, these affirmations of French exceptionalism 
are highly significant. They resonate well with various comparative studies that 
confirm that most Anglo-American and European Continental legal systems recognize 
the right of suspects to see a lawyer and be notified of the right to silence.
59
 
I have taken a closer look at a number of foreign legal systems to get a better 
picture of France’s position on this issue at a global level, focusing on European 
Continental legal systems but also selecting examples from the common law and 
Asian legal traditions as well as two specific examples from Latin America and the 
Middle East. The following countries served as comparators: Canada, the United 
States, Argentina, Ireland, England and Wales, Scotland, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
the Russian Federation, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece, Slovenia, 
Israel, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Japan and China.
60
 My inquiries were limited to 
                                                        
57
 H. Matsopoulou, ‘Garde à vue: la Cour de cassation partagée entre conventionnalité et 
constitutionnalité – À propos des arrêts de la chambre criminelle du 19 octobre 2010’, La semaine 
juridique 2010, 2096. 
58
 C. Lazerges, ‘Les désordres de la garde à vue’, Revue de science criminelle 2010, 275. 
59
 See G. Van Kessel, ‘European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence’, 
100 West Virginia Law Review 799, 808 (1997-1998); C. Bradley (ed), Criminal Procedure: A 
Worldwide Study (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1999) 428; S. Thaman, ‘Miranda in 
Comparative Law’, 45 St Louis University Law Journal 581, 618 (2001); S. Thaman, ‘The Two Faces 
of Justice in the Post-Soviet Legal Sphere: Adversarial Procedure, Jury Trial, Plea-Bargaining and the 
Inquisitorial Legacy’ in Jackson, Langer and Tillers (eds) (n 10 above) 99, 102; T. Spronken and 
others, EU Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings (2009) 32 
<http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=16315> accessed 5 October 2012; Justice, Intervention in HM 
Advocate v. Cadder [2010] UKSC 43, 30 April 2010 <http://www.justice.org.uk/pages/cadder-v-hm-
advocate.html> accessed 5 October 2012. 
60
 I am grateful to Dr Saif Mahmood, Advocate at the Supreme Court of India, and Mr Orowhuo 
Okocha, my PhD student, for their information on India and Nigeria respectively. For information on 
legal assistance and notification of the right to silence in the countries examined here see R. Harvie and 
H. Foster, ‘When the Constable Blunders: A Comparison of the Law of Police Interrogation in Canada 
and the United States’, 19 Seattle University Law Review 497 (1995-1996); Van Kessel, ibid.; Bradley, 
ibid.; Thaman, ibid.; C. Bateman, ‘Dickerson v. United States: Miranda is Deemed a Constitutional 
Rule, but Does it Really Matter ?’, 55 Arkansas Law Review 177 (2002); Y. Ma, ‘The Powers of the 
Police and the Rights of Suspects under the Amended Criminal Procedure Law of China’, 26 Policing: 
An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 490 (2003); B. L. Arora, Law of Speedy 
Trial in India (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 2006); N. Androulakis, Fundamental concepts of 
the criminal trial (Athens: P. N. Sakkoulas, 2007) 360-364 (in Greek); Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations, Report on the Japanese Government’s Implementation of the Convention Against 
Torture, January 18, 2007; Irish Human Rights Commission, Submission to the UN Human Rights 
Committee on the Examination of Ireland’s Third Periodic Report on the ICCPR, March 2008; J. 
Pradel, Droit pénal comparé (Paris: Dalloz, 2008); Amnesty International, Out of the Shadows: Time to 
End Incommunicado Detention (Amnesty International Publications 2009); Y. M. Daly, ‘Is Silence 
Golden? The Legislative and Judicial Treatment of Pre-Trial Silence in Ireland’ (2009) 31 Dublin 
University Law Journal 35; Sénat, La garde à vue, Les documents de travail du Sénat – Série 
législation comparée, 2009, n° LC 204; E. Cape and others, Effective Criminal Defence in Europe: 
Executive Summary and Recommendations (Antwerp-Oxford-Portland: Intersentia, 2010) 
<http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00006287/01/criminal-defence-europe-summary.pdf>, accessed 5 October 
2012; L. Li and Y. Ma, ‘Adjudications and Legal Reforms in Contemporary China’ (2010) 26 Journal 
of Contemporary Criminal Justice 36; V. R. Manohar, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Code of Criminal 
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establishing whether legislation in these countries provides for notification of the right 
to silence, access to legal assistance at the police station and the presence of a lawyer 
during questioning. The answers lead one to paint a bleak picture of French criminal 
procedure’s cosmopolitanism. First of all, of these twenty-two countries, only the 
Russian Federation, Greece, India and China do not provide for notification of the 
right to silence. Belgium has only recently recognized this right, with legislation 
enacted in August 2011.
61
 France was in the same league with these countries until 
the 2011 reform, with the exception of the period between 2000 and 2003. Secondly, 
of the surveyed countries, only China does not give suspects access to legal counsel 
today. Scotland, the Netherlands and Belgium had until recently adopted a similar 
position,
62
 but developments sparked by Salduz v Turkey
63
 have now led to 
recognition of this right.
64
 France had not provided for any legal assistance until the 
1993 reforms. It was only after the June 2000 reforms that suspects finally obtained 
the right to consult with a lawyer from the beginning of the interrogation but, again, 
not in the many cases relating to terrorism, drug trafficking and other organized crime 
offences. One can conclude from the above that France had long set its face against 
the international consensus on this matter. A more equivocal picture is painted if one 
looks at whether the above countries allow suspects to have their lawyer present 
                                                                                                                                                              
Procedure (19
th
 edn, Gurgaon: LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 2010) 110; A. Giudicelli 
and C. Juhász, ‘La “garde à vue” dans la legislation autrichienne’, Revue de science criminelle 2011, 
59; R. Pattenden, ‘Right to Counsel at the Police Station – United Kingdom and Canada’ (2011) 15 E 
& P 70;  C. Boyle and E. Cunliffe, ‘Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation in Canada: Not 
Keeping Up with the Common Law Joneses’ in P. Roberts and J. Hunter, Criminal Evidence and 
Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 79; 
M. Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 95; S. 
Schuman, K. Bruckmüller and R. Soye, Pre-Trial Emergency Defence (NWV/ Intersentia 2012). See 
UN Committee against Torture reports: Argentina, List of Issues, CAT/C/ARG/Q/5-6, 2/8/2010; 
Belgium, Concluding observations, CAT/C/BEL/CP/2, 19/1/2009; China, Concluding observations, 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12/12/2008; Japan, Report submitted by State Party, CAT/C/JPN/1, 21/3/2007; 
Japan, Conclusions and recommendations, CAT/C/JPN/CO/1, 3/8/2007; The Netherlands, Conclusions 
and recommendations, CAT/C/NET/CO/4, 3/8/2007; Spain, Concluding observations, 
CAT/C/ESP/CO/5, 9/12/2009. See European Committee for the Prevention of Torture Reports: CPT 
Report to the Spanish Government, CPT/ Inf (2011) 11, 25/3/2011. See CCPR reports: The 
Netherlands, Concluding observations, CCPR/C/NLD/CO/4, 25/8/2009. On India see also DK Basu v 
State of West Bengal (1997) 21 ACR 277. 
61
 Art 2 de la Loi du 13 août 2011 <http://www.etaamb.be/fr/loi-du-13-aout-2011_n2011009606.html> 
accessed 5 October 2012. 
62
 Under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 14, which has consolidated the Criminal 
Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, police in Scotland had the power to interrogate suspects for six hours 
without allowing them to consult with a lawyer. See J. R. Spencer, ‘Strasbourg and Defendants’ Rights 
in Criminal Procedure’ (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 14. See also D. Giannoulopoulos, ‘ “North 
of the Border and Across the Channel”: Custodial Legal Assistance Reforms in Scotland and France’ 
[2013] Crim LR (forthcoming). In Belgium, article 20 of the Pretrial Detention Act of 20 July 1990 
provided that accused persons would be permitted to communicate freely with their lawyer only after 
the initial hearing before the investigating judge. See UN Committee against Torture, Follow-up replies 
from the Government of Belgium to the concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, 
CAT/C/BEL/CO/2, 28/3/2011, para 74. 
63
 Above (n 1). 
64
 In Scotland, the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 
gave suspects the right to have a private consultation with a solicitor before any questioning by a 
constable begins and at any other time during such questioning. In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court 
held that ‘a suspect arrested by the police must be offered the opportunity to consult a lawyer before 
being interviewed’. LJN BH3079, 30 June 2009, cited by Cadder v. HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, 
para 49. In Belgium, the Law of 13 August 2011 gave suspects the right to meet with a lawyer for 
thirty minutes at the beginning of the detention period, before being questioned by the police. 
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during questioning. More than half of the countries examined here recognize such a 
right.
65
 By way of contrast, France was a long way from endorsing this due process 
centred position throughout the 1990s and the last decade; access to a lawyer is still 
today severely restricted when exceptional regimes of garde à vue are set in motion. 
 It is equally useful to investigate whether these countries afford suspects the 
full panoply of the above-mentioned rights. The fact that the majority of them allow 
suspects to exercise all three rights signifies the importance of adversarial safeguards 
in modern criminal procedure.
66
 Some other countries recognize only two of these 
rights. Thus, in Canada, Germany, Ireland and Japan, suspects are entitled to consult a 
lawyer and be notified of their right to silence but not to have a lawyer present during 
interrogation, whereas in Greece and the Russian Federation, suspects can consult a 
lawyer and be questioned in his presence, but they are not notified of their right to 
silence. Suspects in India are only entitled to access to counsel, whereas China 
recognizes none of these rights. This was also the position in Belgium until the 
August 2011 legislation came into force. Against this comparative law background, 
French exceptionalism quickly reveals itself. Until 1993, none of these rights applied 
in France, while immediately prior to the 2011 reforms, suspects were only still 
entitled to the right to access to counsel.  
At this point, it may be wise to sound a note of caution. The fact that the above 
countries have legislated some or all the rights examined here does not say much 
about how effectively they implement them in practice. Be that as it may, at least the 
vast majority of these countries start from the legal position that these rights must be 
guaranteed. In contrast, France has until recently taken a principled position that these 
rights do not merit protection at this phase of the criminal process, proving that it has 
long been out of keeping with developments in countries in its European 
neighbourhood and the rest of the world.  
 The long-term insistence on a predominantly inquisitorial model of police 
interrogation demonstrates that France has also been out of keeping with important 
developments at the level of international law, most notably the rise to pre-eminence, 
in international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court, of adversarial 
procedural guarantees taking their root at the right to fair trial.
67
 The statutes of these 
international criminal courts have invariably provided for the suspects’ right to be 
informed of their right to silence prior to questioning, to have legal assistance and to 
be questioned in the presence of counsel.
68
 Furthermore, international human rights 
instruments have sanctioned the right to legal assistance,
69
 albeit in a more cryptic 
manner as to its particular applications at the police interrogation stage. Human rights 
treaty bodies and committees have been more categorical about the obligations for 
                                                        
65
 These are Italy, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, England and Wales, Denmark, Austria, the Russian 
Federation, the United States, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina and Israel. Belgium has just introduced 
this right. See art 2bis of the Law of 13 August 2011. In relation to Argentina, it must be noted that the 
Code of Criminal Procedure provides that suspects will only be interrogated by the investigating judge 
and not by the police. When suspects appear before the investigating judge, they are entitled to have a 
lawyer present and are informed of their right to silence. See A. D. Carrió and A. M. Garro, 
‘Argentina’ in C Bradley, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2007) 3, 29. 
66
 These are England and Wales, the United States, Nigeria, South Africa, Denmark, Austria, Spain, 
Italy, Slovenia, Israel, Argentina and, since August 2011, Belgium as well. 
67
 See P. Roberts, ‘Faces of justice Adrift?’ (n 13 above) 326; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law 
(2
nd
 edn, OUP 2008) 353.  
68
 See eg Rule 42 ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence; art 55(2) Rome Statute; art 15 
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
69
 See T. Spronken and others (n 59 above) 21. 
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state parties stemming from this right. The Committee against Torture, for instance, 
has insisted that persons in police custody should have access to legal counsel from 
the outset of their deprivation of liberty. In its 2010 concluding observations on 
France, the Committee asked that the latter should take ‘appropriate legislative 
measures to guarantee immediate access to a lawyer during police custody’.70 In the 
same vein, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture has declared that 
‘access to a lawyer for persons in police custody should include the right to contact 
and to be visited by the lawyer … as well as, in principle, the right for the person 
concerned to have the lawyer present during interrogation’.71 In its 2007 report to 
France, it was also most evident that the Committee was losing patience with the 
country’s continued attempts to circumvent the right to consult with a lawyer. The 
report explained that the Committee had ‘already developed in length, and for several 
years, the arguments in favour of access to counsel from the first hour of deprivation 
of liberty by law enforcement authorities, including in relation to the most serious 
offences’.72 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has made similar 
recommendations to member states.
73
  
At the supranational level, the European Commission’s 2004 proposal for a 
framework decision on certain procedural rights throughout the European Union is 
particularly noteworthy. It contained rules aimed at reinforcing suspects’ access to 
legal advice and notification of their rights at the police station.
74
 Efforts to create 
common minimum standards on the rights of suspects across the EU have gained 
momentum more recently, with a 2009 Roadmap for procedural safeguards
75
 that led 
to a proposal for a Directive on the right to access to lawyer and the right to 
communicate upon arrest.
76
 The proposed Directive provides for access to a lawyer as 
soon as practically possible from the outset of deprivation of liberty and before the 
start of any questioning,
77
 and for lawyers’ presence and active role during 
questioning.
78
 The Roadmap also led to the adoption of a Directive on the right to 
information. Article 3 of the Directive provides that member states shall ensure that 
suspects are provided promptly with information concerning at least certain 
procedural rights. The right to silence features within these rights.
79
  
 In view of the above, France’s parochial attitude to police detention and 
interrogation cannot be easily reconciled with the idea of a fast-growing legal 
cosmopolitanism. The next step in this line of thinking is to take the example of 
France to illustrate that the growing cosmopolitanism argument may be exaggerated 
and that generalizations about modern legal systems’ openness to each other and 
receptivity of international law may have to be approached with greater caution.  
 
                                                        
70
 Annual Report, A/65/44, 2009-10, 95. 
71
 CPT Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev 2010, para 38. 
72
 Emphasis added. Rapport au Gouvernement de la République française relatif à la visite effectuée en 
France par le Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains 
ou dégradants (CPT), du 27 septembre au 9 octobre 2006, CPT/Inf (2007) 44, paras 38-39. 
73
 See Salduz v. Turkey (n 1 above) paras 37-38. 
74
 COM(2004) 328, 28/4/2004. 
75
 OJ C 295, 4/12/2009. 
76
 COM(2011) 326, 8/6/2011. For the revised text, see Council of the European Union 7337/ 12, 9 
March 2012. 
77
 Ibid., art 2.  
78
 Ibid., art 3. 
79
 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to 
information in criminal proceedings.  
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III  LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM AND LEGAL REFORM 
 
Pre-April 14
th
 exceptionalism does not appear to be the result of isolation from 
influences of foreign and international law. In addition to the many treaty body 
reports criticizing the garde à vue, many French research studies had exposed the gap 
separating indigenous custodial interrogation practices from those endorsed by 
foreign countries and international law. For the purposes of illustration, if we go as far 
back as 1991, we see that the report of the Commission Delmas-Marty had relied 
heavily on comparisons of custodial interrogation rules in Anglo-American and 
Continental legal systems.
80
 Likewise, a report attached to the June 2000 legislation 
explained that the provisions on legal assistance aimed to ‘harmonise [French] law 
with the legislation of the principal European countries, which [had] already [been] 
providing, often for several years, for the intervention of a lawyer from the beginning 
of the interrogation’.81 In short, in France there was undoubtedly an awareness that 
the garde à vue was falling short of European and international standards giving 
custodial interrogation an adversarial character. The willingness to bring the garde à 
vue into line with such standards was apparently missing. This changed only when the 
ECtHR proceeded to outright rejection of certain inquisitorial traits of custodial 
interrogation.  
 In Salduz v Turkey,
82
 where the applicant had been denied access to a lawyer 
while in police custody, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR underlined the suspect’s 
particularly vulnerable position at the investigation stage, noting that ‘in most cases, 
this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of 
a lawyer’83 and that ‘early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to 
which the Court will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure has 
extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination’.84 The Court 
concluded that article 6(1) of the Convention requires that ‘as a rule, access to a 
lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, 
unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that 
there are compelling reasons to restrict this right’,85  and that ‘[t]he rights of the 
defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements 
made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a 
conviction’.86  
                                                        
80
 Commission Justice pénale et droits de l’homme, La mise en état des affaires pénales (n 31 above).  
81
 Exposé des motifs du projet de loi renforçant la protection de la présomption d’innocence et des 
droits des victimes <http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/004001243/0000.pdf>  
accessed 5 October 2012. For another example, see the report of the Outreau Commission. Assemblée 
nationale, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d’enquête chargée de rechercher les causes des 
dysfonctionnements de la justice dans l’affaire dite d’Outreau et de formuler des propositions pour 
éviter leur renouvellement, n 3125 (2006) 197 <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/pdf/rap-
enq/r3125-t1.pdf> accessed 5 October 2012. The Commission that investigated the Outreau affair, a 
miscarriage of justice with catastrophic consequences for French criminal justice, proposed reforms 
relating to the assistance of counsel that would ‘better subscribe the garde à vue procedure to European 
norms pertaining to human rights of the defendant’. See generally G Giudicelli-Delage,  ‘La juste 
distance… Réflexions autour de mauvaises ( ?) questions. A propos de la réforme de l’instruction et de 
la procédure pénale française’ in Mélanges dédiés à Bernard Bouloc, Les droits et le droit (Paris: 
Dalloz, 2007) 389. 
82
 (2008) EHRR 421. 
83
 Salduz v. Turkey (n 1 above) para 54. 
84
 Ibid. 
85
 Ibid., at para 55. 
86
 Ibid. 
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In Dayanan v Turkey the Court clarified that the right to effective legal 
assistance requires that a suspect should be assisted by a lawyer ‘as soon as he or she 
is taken into custody … and not only while being questioned’.87 The Court observed 
that a suspect should be able to:  
 
obtain the whole range of services specifically associated with legal 
assistance. In this regard, counsel has to be able to secure without restriction 
the fundamental aspects of that person’s defence: discussion of the case, 
organisation of the defence, collection of evidence favourable to the accused, 
preparation for questioning, support of an accused in distress and checking of 
the conditions of detention.
88
 
 
The French solution of two thirty-minute meetings in 48 hours of interrogation, 
without access to the investigation dossier, could not possibly satisfy the fair trial 
requirements set by the ECtHR.
89
 Lawyers in France were the first to take notice of 
this development, relying on the Court’s jurisprudence to stigmatize the illegal 
character of the garde à vue.
90
 The government’s initial reaction, on the other hand, 
was to downplay the importance of ECtHR decisions not condemning France, though 
there was also recognition of the need to rethink the garde à vue.
91
 However, it was 
the judiciary that was most influenced by the winds of change blowing from 
Strasbourg, as evidenced by the fact that certain jurisdictions put immediately into 
application the principles laid down by its jurisprudence, thus nullifying garde à vue 
measures in cases where suspects had not been assisted by a lawyer.
92
 These were 
first instance or even pre-trial jurisdictions applying the ECtHR jurisprudence at a 
time when higher courts had not yet spoken on the issue.  
This change of attitudes towards custodial interrogation coincided with the 
introduction in March 2010 of an a posteriori and abstract control of constitutionality, 
known as question prioritaire de constitutionnalité (QPC),
93
 allowing for the first 
time individual parties to request that the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional 
Council) should examine the constitutionality of legislation that may be applicable to 
litigation in which they are involved. The very first day the QPC came into effect, an 
application was made targeting a number of garde à vue provisions in the Code de 
                                                        
87
 App no 7377/ 03 (ECtHR, 13 October 2009), para 32. 
88
 Ibid. See also Adamkiewicz c. Pologne, App No 54729/00 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010). 
89
 See J.F. Renucci, ‘L’avocat et la garde à vue: exigences européennes et réalités nationales’, Recueil 
Dalloz 2009, 2897; J. Alix, ‘Les droits de la défense au cours de l’enquête de police après la réforme de 
la garde à vue: état de lieux et perspectives’, Recueil Dalloz 2011, 1699, paras 17-18. 
90
 Renucci, ibid. 2897. 
91
 Ibid. See also Lazerges, ‘Les désordres de la garde à vue’ (n 58 above) 275; Pradel, ‘Vers une 
métamorphose de la garde à vue’ (n 28 above) 2783. 
92
 Matsopoulou, ‘Garde à vue: la Cour de cassation partagée entre conventionnalité et 
constitutionnalité’ (n 61 above) 2094. See also A. Maron and M. Haas, ‘Tandis que les gardes à vues 
explosent, la garde à vue implose…’, Droit pénal 2010, 10; J. Hodgson, ‘The French Prosecutor in 
Question’, 67 Washington & Lee Law Review 1361, 1401 (2010). 
93
 See art 61-1(4) and 62(5) of the Constitution, introduced with Constitutional Law nº 2008-724 and 
Organic Law nº 2009-1523 of 10 December 2009. On the QPC see M. Guillaume, ‘Question prioritaire 
de constitutionnalité et Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’, Nouveaux cahiers du Conseil 
constitutionnel 2011, 67; M. Hunter-Henin, ‘Constitutional Developments and Human Rights in 
France: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 167; C. Lazerges, ‘La question 
prioritaire de constitutionnalité devant le Conseil constitutionnel en droit pénal: entre audace et 
prudence’, Revue de science criminelle 2011, 193. 
 15 
 
procédure pénale (Code of Criminal Procedure),
94
 and in a much anticipated decision, 
on 30 June 2010, the Conseil constitutionnel made a finding of unconstitutionality 
vis-à-vis each one of the provisions it had examined.
95
 The Court noted in particular 
that a person undergoing questioning did not ‘have the benefit of the effective 
assistance from a lawyer’96 and that ‘such a restriction on the rights of the defence 
[was] imposed as a general matter without any consideration of particular 
circumstances likely to justify it’.97 The Court also paid attention to the fact that 
suspects were not being informed of their right to remain silent.
98
  
The ECtHR’s influence is apparent in the above insistence on effective legal 
assistance and the rejection of restricting defence rights solely on the basis of the 
nature of the offence under investigation. Further proof of such influence can be 
found in the oral arguments before the Court that contained many references to Salduz 
and ECHR jurisprudence.
99
 We can explore the same thought by means of a ‘what if’ 
question, asking whether the Conseil constitutionnel would have reached the same 
decision if Salduz had not happened. Bertrand de Lamy answered the question in the 
negative. As he explained, the Conseil constitutionnel suddenly struck down the 
garde à vue legislation, though it had previously never questioned its 
constitutionality, ‘surely under the influence of the European Court of Human 
Rights’.100 André Giudicelli even more graphically illustrated this point:  
 
Surely, we cannot but take pleasure in [the Court’s] awakening, given that 
until now it had never questioned the legislative texts relevant to the garde à 
vue … [T]his awakening is to a large extent due to a European fanfare the 
echoes of which have reached the windows of the Palais Royal,
101
 no doubt 
open this end of July 2010.
102
  
 
Surprisingly, however, the Conseil constitutionnel did not proceed to repealing 
immediately the provisions it had just found unconstitutional, postponing giving its 
decision any effect until 1 July 2011, eleven months later, to allow parliament to 
remedy the situation in the mean time.
103
 Even in this way, the decision of the Conseil 
                                                        
94
 P. Robert-Diard, ‘Nouvelle offensive des avocats contre les conditions de garde à vue: Ils veulent 
profiter de l’entrée en vigueur d’une disposition de la réforme constitutionnelle’, Le Monde (Paris, 2 
March 2010) discussed by Hodgson, ‘The French Prosecutor in Question’ (n 92 above) 1403. 
95
 Conseil constitutionnel, Décision n° 2010−14/22 QPC du 30 juillet 2010, available in English at  
<http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank/download/201014_22QPCen201014qpc.pdf> accessed 5 October 2012. On 
the other hand, the Court refused to examine, on technical grounds, the constitutionality of the 
exceptional regimes of garde à vue. See para 13 of the decision. 
96
 Ibid., at para 28. 
97
 Ibid. 
98
 Ibid. 
99
 See the video recordings of the public audience of July 20, 2010, <http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/acces-videos/decisions/2010/affaires-n-2010-14-qpc-
et-n-2010-22-qpc.48722.html> accessed 5 October 2012. 
100
 ‘L’avancée des garanties en matière de garde à vue ou la consécration d’un basculement de la 
procédure pénale vers la phase policière’, Revue de science criminelle 2011, 165. It must be noted here 
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constitutionnel, along with ECHR jurisprudence, served as a foundation for the 
decisions of the Cour de cassation (Supreme Court of France) that led to the 
institution of a new regime of garde à vue even before the Law of April 14
th
 came 
into effect.  
On October 19
th
, three judgments of the plenary session of the Cour de 
cassation (assemblée plenière)
104
 struck the first blow. The Court found that for the 
requirements of article 6 of the Convention to be satisfied, the suspect must not be 
questioned in the absence of his lawyer,
105
 that he must be informed of the right to 
silence and be assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of the garde à vue, unless 
there are compelling reasons to restrict the right or the suspect has unequivocally 
waived his right,
106
 and, finally, that the right to access to a lawyer cannot be 
restricted solely on the basis of the nature of the offence concerned.
107
 In brief, taking 
its inspiration directly from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the Cour de cassation 
placed legal assistance during police questioning and notification of the right to 
silence at the centre of the garde à vue. However, aligning itself with the Conseil 
constitutionnel as well, the Court stopped short of giving immediate effect to the rules 
it announced, postponing their application until 1 July 2011. 
 These decisions were published only five days after the ECtHR, in Brusco v. 
France, condemned France for the first time for shortcomings of the regime of the 
garde à vue, in a case where the suspect had not been notified of his right to silence 
and had not been assisted by a lawyer until twenty hours of interrogation had passed. 
In line with Salduz and Dayanan, the ECtHR noted that a person subjected to a garde 
à vue ‘has the right to be assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of this measure as 
well as during questioning, and this is a fortiori the case when he has not been 
informed by the authorities of his right to silence’.108 This decision was a turning 
point for the reform of custodial interrogation à la française. Until then, ECHR case 
law on custodial interrogation was being dismissed by some as ‘having no obligatory 
force upon France, which had never been condemned by the ECtHR on that 
subject’.109 
 In any case, the Cour de cassation continued its assault on the garde à vue 
unabated. With its January 2011 decisions
110
 the Court confirmed that the new rules 
on effective legal assistance would not come into effect until the deadline set by the 
Conseil constitutionnel had passed or new legislation had been introduced, but at the 
same time, it found that confessional evidence obtained in the course of the garde à 
vue, without the suspect benefiting from effective legal assistance, was inadmissible 
in trial and that this rule was going to have immediate effect. This meant that the now 
well-established incompatibility of the garde à vue with the ECHR was not going to 
be emptied of substance as a result of the suspended effect of the decision of the 
Conseil constitutionnel.
111
 The ECtHR’s grip upon the Cour de cassation is manifest 
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here; the French conception of custodial interrogation had to give way to that now 
exported by the European judges. 
 The Cour de cassation, again in a plenary session, drove that point home with 
its seminal decisions of April 15
th
.
112
 The decisions coincided with the publication of 
the Law of 14 April 2011, which was to take effect on June 1
st
. In this instance, the 
Court opted for the immediate effect of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, underlining 
that ‘the states adhering to the Convention … are held to respect the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights, without waiting to be taken to it first nor to have 
modified their legislation’.113 In so doing, the Cour de cassation broke loose from the 
influence of Conseil constitutionnel jurisprudence to give primacy to that of the 
ECtHR.
114
 It also left the government no room to manoeuvre, forcing it to follow in 
its steps, as evidenced by the immediate press release of the Minister of Justice, 
instructing prosecutors to apply without delay the rules of the Law of April 14
th
 
pertaining to assistance during questioning and notification of the right to silence. 
 Then, on May 31
st
, the Cour de cassation went so far as to give its decisions 
full retroactive effect. The Court found violations of the right to a fair trial in four 
cases where suspects had been subjected to custodial interrogation prior to the coming 
into effect of the rules adopted by the assemblée plenière on April 15
th
. The suspects 
had neither been notified of their right to remain silent nor been assisted by a lawyer 
from the beginning of the garde à vue.
115
 These were remarkable decisions, especially 
if one considers that they had the ability to lead to thousands of measures of garde à 
vue being retroactively nullified.
116
  
 Considered in the round, France’s reception of Salduz and its aftermath merits 
special attention, particularly since it seems to discord with previous observations 
about French reservations towards giving effect to the European Convention.
117
 The 
mere speed and stealth with which the Cour de cassation has attempted to transform 
the French garde à vue since Salduz and Dayanan, and even more so since Brusco, is 
testament to both the ECHR’s power to transform national law and France’s ability to 
accommodate such transformative power. It is important to note here that since the 
end of the 90s the Cour de cassation had been making considerable efforts to 
reinforce suspects’ rights at the police station – mainly by developing a jurisprudence 
of automatic ‘exclusion’ of confessional evidence obtained in violation of custodial 
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interrogation rights –, and yet, as we have seen above, it was only ECHR 
jurisprudence that allowed for more drastic reform in this area. This points directly to 
Law’s increasing cosmopolitanism, especially if one takes into account that the 
radical reforms inspired by Strasbourg happened against the backdrop of two 
centuries of incremental development in the area of police interrogation in France.
118
  
Emphasis can be added to this observation if we take into consideration 
previous failed attempts to remove inquisitorial aspects of the garde à vue. We have 
seen that criticism of the garde à vue from within the legal system was consistently 
met with resistance and in the end, it was only criticism from without that made it 
possible to overcome such resistance and lead to considerable change. Nevertheless, 
attention needs to be called to the fact that it was specifically the ECtHR that 
mandated reform in this case, whereas criticism originating from treaty body reports 
or comparisons with foreign legal systems had failed to instigate any change. No 
attention had been paid to the more adversarial position adopted by international 
criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court either. 
The ECtHR’s impact in this domain signifies cosmopolitan Law’s capacity to 
act as a driving force for legal reform, echoing Delmas-Marty’s observation that the 
Court ‘obliges States to legislate in domains … where no one dared venture, or to 
shift a long-standing and subtle balance of powers’.119 Nonetheless, caution is again 
required when extrapolating legal systems’ cosmopolitan attitudes from the influence 
that Strasbourg jurisprudence may be exercising upon them. More specifically, 
particular weight must be attached to the ECtHR’s privileged position in the 
international law landscape. The ECHR overrides national law in many European 
countries,
120
 including France,
121
 and these countries most of the time introduce 
legislative changes to accommodate the Court’s findings.122 The ECtHR is praised for 
its effectiveness in inspiring human rights reform; Heifer describes it as ‘the crown 
jewel of the world’s most advanced system for protecting civil and political 
liberties’. 123  Thus, the ECHR is ‘part-and-parcel of an emergent legal 
cosmopolitanism’. 124 It is the human rights instrument that shapes Law’s 
cosmopolitanism par excellence. From this point of view, it is certainly important for 
this case study to provide affirmation of ECHR’s cosmopolitan effect on the 
development of national legal systems. More intriguing, however, is the fact that this 
study pinpoints the ECHR’s impact as the sole source of cosmopolitan influences on 
national law. More particularly, this study demonstrates that with respect to the 
reform of the garde à vue, legal cosmopolitanism did not extend beyond a ‘forced’ 
importation of international law and that, contrarily, there were no signs of a 
‘spontaneous’ importation of foreign and international law. 125  Put another way, 
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France was forced to legislate in this area under the weight of potential new 
condemnations by the ECtHR
126
 rather than spontaneously opting for reform in the 
light of the experience of foreign legal systems or by taking into account international 
human rights standards, including those now embedded in international criminal 
procedure as well as those encapsulated by recommendations of human rights treaty 
bodies specifically addressing the need for reform. This approach has little 
resemblance to cosmopolitanism, if we perceive cosmopolitanism as the 
interconnection and interpenetration of different legal cultures, as a phenomenon that 
encompasses ‘the possibility of dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others 
with the aim of expanding the horizons of one’s own framework of meaning and 
prejudice’.127 
In this light, manifestations of the legal cosmopolitanism phenomenon in 
France can be more properly described as cosmopolitan pressures coming from 
outside the national legal system rather than indigenous cosmopolitan attitudes 
spontaneously generated from within. But pressures from outside can easily be 
perceived as threatening national sovereignty and national legal culture and can 
therefore lead to local resistance.  
   
IV. LOCAL RESISTANCE 
 
Salduz and its aftermath have empowered French courts to engineer a new landscape 
of procedural rights applying to custodial interrogation. Strasbourg’s influence 
becomes much less visible though if one looks at the legislative process that led to the 
introduction of the Law of April 14
th
. In fact, close scrutiny allows for two important 
discoveries. First, some of the adversarial rights incorporated into the garde à vue 
with the Law of April 14
th
 have been resisted throughout the process, and second, 
despite appearances to the contrary, this legislation is still ingrained with the 
inquisitorial idea that the lawyer must be limited to a passive role at this stage of the 
process. A number of examples illustrating these two points will be provided below.  
 
4.1 Resistance in the Lead up to the Law of April 14
th
  
 
At the time that Salduz was decided, the President of the French Republic had just set 
up the Léger Commission, with the objective to undertake ‘a global analysis of the 
state of criminal justice in France’.128 Regarding the garde à vue, the Commission 
was of the opinion that lawyers’ presence had to be reinforced yet did not go any 
further than simply recommending a second thirty-minute meeting between the 
lawyer and the suspect 12 hours into the interrogation. Certain members were of the 
view that the lawyer should be present from the beginning of the garde à vue and 
during questioning, but the majority feared that this would jeopardize the efficient 
investigation of crime.
129
  
A few months after the publication of this report, parliament rejected a 
proposal for a legislative amendment that would have given suspects the right to be 
                                                        
126
 This was most evident in parliamentary discussions of the Law of April 14. See Commission des 
lois constitutionnelles, Compte rendu n° 25, session ordinaire de 2010-11, 9 décembre 2010. 
127
 Held (n 16 above) 110. 
128
P. Léger, Rapport du Comité de réflexion sur la justice pénale (2009) 2                                                       
< http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/sg_rapport_leger2_20090901.pdf> accessed 5 October 2012. 
129
 Ibid. 18. 
 20 
 
assisted by a lawyer when questioned by the police.
130
 The proposal was explicitly 
drawn from Salduz and Dayanan, concluding that it was ‘imperative and urgent to 
modify French legislation in order to conform with the right to fair trial’.131 Other 
proposals going in the direction of conformity with the ECHR had the same fate.
132
 
The Minister of Justice had just introduced a Bill for the Reform of Criminal 
Procedure and parliament allegedly wanted to focus on that.
133
 However, the Bill 
proved ‘modest when compared with the more ambitious and ECtHR-inspired 
proposals’ mentioned above. 134  It reproduced the recommendations of the Léger 
Commission, mainly an opportunity to meet with a lawyer for thirty minutes after 12 
hours of interrogation, coupled with continuous legal assistance in questioning in 
cases where the garde à vue would be extended beyond the 24-hour time limit.
135
 
Notification of the right to silence was not included in the Bill. The Minister of 
Justice at the time, Michelle Alliot-Marie, explained in an interview that in drafting 
the Bill the Ministry had taken into account ‘many decades of jurisprudence of the 
Conseil constitutionnel and the ECtHR’,136 but in view of the above, one may be 
tempted to think that Salduz and Dayanan had escaped their attention.  
The decision of the Conseil constitutionnel of July 30
th
 was more influential, 
leading to the legislative Bill that formed the basis for the Law of April 14
th
. The Bill 
provided for legal assistance during questioning and notification of the right to 
silence, but it gave the Prosecutor the power to delay the lawyer’s presence for 12 
hours, while also maintaining the exceptional garde à vue regime applying to offences 
related to organized crime.
137
 More worryingly, the Bill provided for the institution of 
a new procedure, provocatively named audition libre (‘free questioning’), which 
would allow the police to question consenting suspects without their being entitled to 
any of the rights that would normally apply at the garde à vue.
138
  
Notwithstanding the removal of this controversial measure,
139
 the Bill had a 
smooth passage through parliament. Nevertheless, the relevant parliamentary 
discussions reveal that reform of the garde à vue was not particularly welcome by 
members of parliament, who saw the reform as being imposed upon them as a result 
of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the Conseil constitutionnel and the Cour de 
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cassation.
140
 A fear of new condemnations by Strasbourg and a sense of the 
inevitability of the adoption of the Bill, to prevent such a development, pervaded the 
debates. In any case, parliament played second fiddle to the courts, in the 
unprecedented attack that the latter orchestrated against the inquisitorial model of 
custodial interrogation. Parliament’s reserved attitude towards the transition to an 
interrogation model more consistent with adversarial principles is crystallised in the 
form that the Law of April 14
th
 has taken.  
 
4.2 The Law of April 14
th
: Putting the Brakes on the Adversarial-Orientated Rights 
 
Recognition of the right of the suspect to ‘ask that the lawyer assists him in 
interrogations’141 is a major innovation of the Law of April 14th. Once the suspect has 
asked for such assistance, questioning cannot be initiated in the absence of a court-
appointed lawyer or a lawyer appointed by the suspect,
142
 not before the expiry of a 
period of two hours at least. In cases where the lawyer arrives after the two hours 
have elapsed, the questioning has to cease, if the suspect makes such a request, to 
allow for a thirty-minute confidential meeting with the lawyer.
143
 Lawyers can now 
also access the report concerning the notification of rights and the questioning of the 
suspect.
144
  
In principle, the above rights should have the capacity to enhance the 
adversarial character of the garde à vue by creating opportunities for suspects to more 
actively participate in this process and to contest the officials in charge. However, 
these rights are subjected to a number of important exceptions, which minimize their 
effect on the deeply rooted inquisitorial character of the process. First of all, the 
Procureur de la République (the prosecutor who supervises the garde à vue) can 
authorize the initiation of questioning before the two-hour period has expired when 
the necessities of the investigation require that the suspect be immediately 
questioned.
145
 The Procureur can also decide that the presence of the lawyer in 
questioning should be deferred altogether, for a period of 12 hours, and can ask the 
Juge des libertés et de la detention (JLD) – a judge responsible for certain coercive 
measures taken in the course of the garde à vue – to postpone the lawyer’s presence 
in questioning for another 12 hours.
146
 There must be compelling reasons for 
postponement, deriving from the particular circumstances of the case, either the need 
to collect or preserve evidence or the need to prevent an imminent attack upon other 
persons. In these cases, the Procureur or the JLD can also decide that the lawyer 
should not have access to the reports of the questioning of the suspect.
147
 
Furthermore, the lawyer can take notes during the interview
148
 but cannot ask any 
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questions before the police have finished interviewing the suspect.
149
 The lawyer can 
be blocked from asking questions even at the end of the interview if his questions are 
capable of damaging the investigation.
150
 This means that, in reality, lawyers are 
restricted to providing psychological support and perhaps raising awareness of the 
right to silence. Granted this, it is difficult to argue that the Law of April 14
th
 allows 
suspects to obtain the whole range of services specifically associated with legal 
assistance as mandated by Dayanan.
151
 
This is a fortiori the case in relation to organized crime offences, where the 
lawyer’s intervention can be delayed for 48 hours, and in relation to terrorism and 
drug trafficking, where the lawyer can be excluded from the interrogation for a whole 
72 hours.
152
 On the other hand, a positive influence of Salduz is that the above 
exceptional regimes can no longer be set in motion automatically on the sole basis of 
the type of the offence in question but rather only when there exist compelling 
reasons in the light of the particular circumstances of each case.
153
   
Finally, the Law of April 14
th
 added an important evidentiary rule to the 
preliminary article (article préliminaire) of the Code of criminal procedure. It 
provides that ‘no conviction can be pronounced against a person on the sole basis of 
statements made without having been able to consult with a lawyer and be assisted by 
him’.154 At face value, this rule protects against basing a conviction on potentially 
unreliable confessional evidence obtained in violation of a fundamental right of the 
suspect. However, this is true only to the extent that there is no additional 
corroborating evidence. If there is, then this rule’s effect is to allow the use of the 
confessional evidence. An amendment to this rule that would have seen the word sole 
removed, turning the corroboration rule into an automatic exclusionary rule, gave rise 
to a vivid debate in parliament, which, however, decided to retain the rule in its 
original form.
155
 
On the issue of notification of the right to silence, it suffices to note that the 
Law of April 14
th
 re-introduced the wording that was in place between 2002 and 
2003; police officers have to immediately inform a suspect subjected to a garde à vue 
that he has the right to ‘make a statement, answer the questions posed to him or 
remain silent’.156 The reluctance of the legislator to place the emphasis on the right to 
remain silent is quite obvious here; talking to the police – and risking self-
incrimination – is put on an equal footing with exercising the fundamental right to 
remain silent. 
The above provisions clearly demonstrate that the garde à vue remains 
ingrained with the inquisitorial logic. The rejection of adversarialism was nowhere 
more evident than in the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel of 18 November 
2011. Faced with a question prioritaire de constitutionnalité
157
 that challenged certain 
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aspects of the regime of police interrogation instituted with the Law of April 14
th
, the 
Court accepted that the need to reinforce defence rights did not impose that police 
interrogation should be conducted in a way that allows for adversarial confrontation 
(débat contradictoire).
158
 In upholding the constitutionality of various provisions 
limiting the lawyer’s role in the garde à vue, the Court placed emphasis on the fact 
that the new legislative framework provided for notification of the right to silence and 
for lawyers to be present during the questioning of the suspect and that it prohibited 
basing convictions solely on confessions obtained in the absence of legal 
assistance.
159
 
 In brief, it appears that, even with little room for manoeuvre, the executive and 
legislature still mounted considerable resistance to external pressures for reform and 
that the judiciary, the Conseil constitutionnel in this case, accommodated such 
resistance.  
 
4.3 Why Resistance? 
 
For France’s dogmatic attachment to a model of custodial interrogation rooted 
in the inquisitorial tradition, a plethora of diverse explanations can be suggested. A 
number of them underlie the analysis in Section II; the historic continuity of lawyers’ 
absence from the pre-trial process coupled with an obsession with confessional 
evidence (culture de l’aveu), for example, or the extreme politicization of the debate 
on suspects’ rights, especially against the background of post-9/11 security dominated 
political agendas. Other possible explanations may touch upon the characteristics of 
inquisitorial criminal procedure, for example the conception of truth discovery as ‘the 
quintessential goal of inquisitorial justice’160 or, more particularly, the emphasis on 
trusting the capacity of the State ‘to pursue truth unprompted by partisan pressures of 
individual self-interest’.161 Institutional factors cannot figure less prominently in a list 
of possible explanations for the reluctance to endorse a more adversarial approach. 
Hodgson’s work is a testament to this, as can be summed up in her observation that 
French criminal justice ‘is a system which structurally and ideologically excludes the 
defence’. 162  Perhaps efforts to explain resistance could also collapse into the 
simplistic thesis that the police want less intervention in their work, while lawyers 
want to intervene more. But since this thesis would not be idiosyncratic of France – 
intuitively we would expect this to be true of the police and lawyers everywhere, 
irrespective of jurisdiction – it would fail to explain why France in particular, in 
contrast for example with most other European countries, has for so long failed to 
recognise a role for lawyers at the police station. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to note that, if one concentrates on the 
debates in parliament, legal nationalism also emerges as a possible source of 
resistance of the inquisitorial ideal against the pressures for reform coming from 
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outside. We can take the example of Philippe Goujon MP, whose comments echo a 
particular discontent with Strasbourg’s impact on French criminal procedure: 
 
Everything happened as a result of the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which is without doubt influenced by Anglo-Saxon law. 
Perhaps we were wrong not to advance the principles of our Law within the 
international institutions. Here we are now, forced to tack on the inquisitorial 
procedure that applies in France mechanisms for the protection of civil 
liberties adapted to an adversarial procedure, which is causing great 
difficulties.
163
 
 
In the same vein, Michel Mercier, the Minister of Justice who brought the April 14
th
 
legislation to parliament, reflecting on developments that he interpreted as movements 
towards the construction of a European criminal procedure, sounded a note of caution, 
insisting that the ‘reform [had] to maintain a French character, since justice, which is 
always an expression of culture, [could] not be tacked on from outside’.164 
 Then again the European framework often becomes the last bastion of French 
resistance against reforms that find their inspiration in principles of adversarial 
criminal procedure. Movements away from the inquisitorial ideal are interpreted as 
movements towards the ECHR-inspired principle of contradictoire rather than a shift 
towards adversarialism, and suspects’ rights are seen as engineered to facilitate 
informed participation rather than adversarial confrontation.
165
 This was a recurrent 
theme in the debates surrounding the 1993 and 2000 garde à vue reforms that 
strengthened defence rights
166
 and was equally present in the parliamentary debates 
that preceded the Law of April 14
th
.
167
 For a legal system heavily invested in its 
inquisitorially rooted pre-trial arrangements, it is arguably very difficult to admit to 
adversarial reforms that have the potential to unsettle – or to be seen to unsettle – such 
arrangements, hence the preference for the principle of contradictoire, which can be 
far more easily accommodated, due to being seen as a compromise of inquisitorial 
and adversarial criminal justice principles rather than as a pure reflection of the latter.  
The above resonate well with Summers’s thoughts on legal nationalism, that 
‘it is perhaps inevitable that criminal law and procedure, which until recently have 
been situated (trapped?) within the geographical and territorial confines of the nation 
state, should be closely identified with, and influenced by, that state’ and that the 
indifference towards and mistrust of other criminal justice systems that this 
nationalism generates can hinder reform or help protect the identity of the national 
legal system, depending on the perspective one takes.
168
 This seems to be a fortiori 
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the case at a time of globalization, if we accept that globalization can breed 
nationalism.
169
 
 
V  CONCLUSION 
 
The contextual inquiry undertaken in this paper casts a shadow on legal 
cosmopolitanism’s easily assumed ubiquity, especially if cosmopolitanism is defined 
broadly as a capacity to interact with foreign and international law, free from the 
parochial limitations inherent in national legal systems. Pre-April 14
th
 French 
exceptionalism in the area of custodial interrogation pinpoints a legal system that had 
become rigid, isolated and immune to external influences detracting from the 
inquisitorial model, thus exhibiting a considerable lack of cosmopolitan vision.  
On the other hand, this inquiry also demonstrates that legal cosmopolitanism 
can be a powerful force for legal reform, as evidenced by the dramatic effect that 
Strasbourg jurisprudence has had upon the modern transformations of the garde à 
vue. Strasbourg’s influence is particularly noteworthy given the importance of current 
debates, on the ECtHR’s growing impact on national sovereignty and national legal 
culture, notably in relation to criminal justice matters that are ‘usually seen as very 
much a quintessential part of national sovereignty’.170 The ECHR’s binding force and 
special place within the European legal landscape explain why it constitutes the most 
characteristic expression of Law’s growing cosmopolitanism at the European level. 
The more crucial and troubling question then is whether Law’s cosmopolitanism also 
manifests itself outside this context. France’s exceptionalism in the area of custodial 
interrogation until the moment that the ECtHR took action provides the example of a 
country where this has evidently not been the case.
171
 
To stay with the point, it is also intriguing to observe how the impact of 
external cosmopolitan influences may fluctuate depending on the institution that is at 
the receiving end. In relation to the Law of April 14
th
, the judiciary has been quick to 
translate ECHR jurisprudence into a true driving force for reform. Strasbourg’s 
influence has been much less felt by the executive and the legislature, which 
obstructed full departure from the inquisitorial paradigm.
172
 
The above analysis also indicates how legal cosmopolitanism goes hand in 
hand with local resistance. Openness to other legal cultures and receptivity of 
international influences can simultaneously generate resistance and insularity, often 
encapsulated in the idea of a defence of national legal culture. This paper provides 
ample evidence of this, thus resonating with globalization theories that explore the 
very complex, and often contradictory, ways in which the global interacts with the 
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local and which accept that the global does not necessarily minimize the importance 
of the local.
173
 This paper also offers an illustration of the fact that ‘[g]lobalisation 
processes do not only favour cultural interconnectedness, they favour cultural 
disconnectedness as well’174 and that ‘[g]lobalisation involves diversity as well as 
uniformity, the local as well as the global’.175 From this angle, this paper agrees with 
David Nelken that ‘the local sense of any given global initiative needs to be carefully 
deconstructed’.176 
The legal cosmopolitanism–local resistance duality leads to a final thought 
that could give birth to a further line of inquiry. In a discussion of legal 
cosmopolitanism, Paul Roberts underlined the ‘significance of quotidian demands of 
local conditions ‘on the ground’ ’, considering that their interaction with 
internationalism’s homogenizing pressures can ‘perpetuate, and indeed reinvigorate 
and extend the diversity and distinctiveness of national legal cultures’.177 Now, in the 
light of the analysis of local resistance in France, we can reflect on the conditions 
required to facilitate and optimize this process of diversification and preservation of 
national legal culture that would not go against Law’s growing cosmopolitanism. As 
is evident in this paper, local resistance can be a conservative force if it takes its roots 
solely in legal nationalism, tradition or the interests of members of particular legal 
professions, all the more so when the law resisted consists of human rights standards 
that are universalistic in nature and, consequently, much less affected by nation state 
particularities than most other domains of law. In addition, it is logical that the more 
power to initiate legal reform is given to international and transnational law 
institutions, the more the likelihood for resistance increases. Legal reform in such 
cases appears in the eyes of the nation state as being ‘imposed’ from above, an attack 
on national sovereignty, hence the increased likelihood for resistance as opposed to a 
scenario where the need for reform would have been recognized from inside.  
In view of the above, for the interaction between cosmopolitanism and 
resistance to produce the positive effect described by Roberts, it is instructive to ask 
whether legal cosmopolitanism can go beyond mere domestication of international 
law to find accommodation within the legal system itself. Put another way, we need to 
consider what needs to be done for legal systems to start using the full spectrum of the 
institutional sources of law; what needs to be done so that, in addition to looking 
upwards to public international law – as French courts have done in this case, with 
admirable results –, legal systems also start looking outwards and sideways to foreign 
legal systems and the possibilities of engaging in a true dialogue with them.
178
 
A renewed emphasis on comparative law and comparative legal studies, as a 
means to generate genuine interest from within national legal systems for the 
solutions adopted in foreign legal cultures and international legal orders, may then 
have a lot to commend it as the appropriate way forward towards truly cosmopolitan 
legal systems, considering in particular comparative law’s dual function; its ability to 
contribute to integration, by making it possible to bypass divergence through 
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synthesis and hybridization, as well as its ability to lead to resistance
179
 by explaining 
the differences and reinforcing national solutions.
180
  
 
                                                        
179
 M. Delmas-Marty, Les forces imaginantes du droit: Le relatif et l’universel (n 119 above) 15. 
180
 Canivet, ‘The Practice of Comparative Law by the Supreme Courts’ (n 19 above) 325. 
